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The Meaning of Mood – Embedded Clauses in Spanish as a Case in 
Point
Abstract
Mental space theory is a cognitive framework that explains the interpretation of linguistic expressions: it explains how 
interlocutors get from input to output. Whereas in traditional semantics words are taken to possess a static, prefabricated 
meaning, cognitive frameworks take meaning to be the result of an interpretive process.
This article explains how mental space theory can be used in an analysis of mood in embedded clauses in Spanish. 
It starts from the assumption that the meaning of mood is constructed by interlocutors in an interpretive process on 
the basis of information from the modal morphemes combined with information from the linguistic as well as the 
extra-linguistic context. The interpretive process is represented as a sequence of mental spaces which are linked and 
structured on the basis of information from language and context.
1. Introduction
When I fi rst started my PhD on the establishment of reference in Spanish noun phrases, I needed 
a theoretical framework with a notational system in which I could make explicit the conceptu-
alisation of noun phrases. I discussed this with my supervisor, Torben Thrane, and he suggested 
Fauconnier’s mental space theory. 
The theoretical advantage of the theory of mental spaces is that it explains the interpretation of 
linguistic expressions, that is, the process rather than the product of the process, and it is therefore 
appropriate for representing how meaning is established in an interpretive process on the basis of 
information from linguistic expressions. The theory of mental spaces has been widely used as a 
framework for explaining how meaning is established on the basis of various linguistic expres-
sions such as pronouns, aspect and modal forms. 
It is the aim of this paper to explain the meaning of mood in embedded clauses in Spanish in 
the perspective of the theory of mental spaces.
It is assumed that the meaning of mood is established in an interpretive process on the basis of 
information from the modal morphemes and the context in which they occur. A sketch of how this 
claim can be substantiated is given by an analysis of a selected number of examples. 
2. Mood as a grammatical category
In Spanish, mood is one of the three infl ectional forms of the verb: tense, aspect and mood. Each 
of these forms specifi es a particular dimension of the situation established by the verb. It is a ba-
sic premise of this paper that mood provides information about how situations are linked in space. 
Before explaining this point, I will briefl y address mood: its characteristics and how it has been 
described in the literature.
Spanish infl ects for the indicative, the subjunctive and the imperative, and mood distinctions 
can be made both in independent clauses and in all three kinds of subordinate clauses: embedded 
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clauses, relative clauses and adverbial clauses. Unlike independent clauses, subordinate clauses 
only allow the indicative and the subjunctive. The use of one or the other form depends on the 
meaning of the superordinate clause. For instance, expressions of emotion only allow the subjunc-
tive in the embedded clause, whereas expressions of security only allow the indicative in the em-
bedded clause, as exemplifi ed in (1)-(2).
(1)  Me alegra que puedas(subj) venir.
‘I am happy that you can come.’
(2)  Es seguro que vas(ind) a venir.
‘It is certain that you will come.’
The fact that some superordinate expressions are compatible with only one or the other modal 
form has led to the widespread view that mood is a question of government. However, the mood 
system is far more complicated than mere government as many subordinate clauses, including 
embedded clauses, allow double selection, as shown by the following examples:
(3ª) Dice que vienen(ind).
‘He says that they will come.’
(3b) Dice que vengan(subj).
‘He says that they must come.’
(3a) and (3b) show that superordinate clauses with verb phrases headed by decir can combine 
with both the indicative and the subjunctive, depending on the meaning that the speaker wants to 
convey. As mood in Spanish seems to be subject to (semantic) government in some cases and to 
speakers’ selection in others, an explanation of mood must be sought that explains the connec-
tion between the expressions of so-called government and those of double selection. I will argue, 
along with others, that such an account takes its starting point in the semantics of mood.
3. The semantics of mood
With a starting point in Thrane (1998), this article assumes that situations established by verbs in 
the indicative are always located in time and space. No matter whether the situation is described 
by the superordinate expression as being guaranteed or felt, as exemplifi ed by (4) and (5) below, 
the situation has the same basic meaning: it has existence in time and space, and can as such be 
characterised as factual (see section 5). 
(4)  Les garantizo que el Gobierno no va(ind) a presionar.
‘I guarantee you that the Government will not put on pressure.’
(5)  Lo que sucede con el obeso es que siente que no tiene(ind) control sobre nada.
‘What happens with the obese person is that he feels that he does not have anything under his control.’
 (examples extracted from REA – CREA)
By contrast with the indicative, the meaning of the subjunctive is harder to determine, as demon-
strated by example (1) above, repeated below as (6), and (7)-(8).
(6)  Me alegra que puedas(subj) venir.
‘I am happy that you can come.’
(7)  Hay muchos que esperan que caigan(subj).
‘There are many that hope that they will fall.’
(8)  Javier no creía que estuviera(subj) en casa Carmen.
‘Javier did not think that Carmen was at home.’
(6) establishes a situation which has already come into existence, ‘you can come’. The situation 
established by (7), on the other hand, has not yet come into existence but is merely hoped for. (8) 
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does not carry information as to whether the situation of the referent of Carmen being at home is 
a fact or not. The use of the subjunctive merely shows the speaker’s lack of belief that the situa-
tion is a fact (see section 5 for a more detailed analysis).
Various studies have striven to formulate a general meaning of the subjunctive which can ex-
plain its diversity of meaning. RAE (1973) sums up the main traditional viewpoints on the seman-
tics of mood in Spanish. The account (1973: 353) takes its starting point in the distinction between 
dictum and modus, between what is said and the “subjective attitude” (la actitud subjetiva), the 
attitude of the speaker towards this. The modal forms are one of the means that language provides 
for expressing modus. When the indicative is used, the verbal action is conceived as being real 
or not real (depending on negation), and when the subjunctive is used, the verbal action is not re-
garded as real (1973: 454). 
The idea that mood refl ects the speaker’s attitude towards the content of the sentence goes back 
as far as Salvá (1830) (Manteca Alonso-Cortéz 1981: 13), and the reality/non-reality distinction is 
generally used in grammar books, in different variations (e.g. Togeby 1963, RAE 1973, Alarcos 
Llorach 1994, Gili Gaya 1994).
One of the fi rst attempts to give a more meticulous account of mood in Spanish is Terrell/Hoop-
er (1974). They suggested the distinction between assertion/non-assertion with a starting point in 
Lenz (1944), among others, who associated mood with semantic concepts such as assertion and 
presupposition. Their theory can be seen as a reaction to structuralist and transformational theo-
ries, which generally took mood to be a question of government (a view that is basic to many de-
scriptions of mood, as mentioned above). The assertion/non-assertion distinction has formed the 
basis of the major part of research in mood in Spanish (see for example Travis 2003, Mejías-Bi-
candi 1994, 1998a, 1998b and Gregory 2001).
To assert something means to attribute something with a truth-value. In this sense, assertion 
refers to real-world situations. According to the assertion theory, mood depends on the truth of 
the proposition of the embedded clause: the indicative refl ects assertion, whereas the subjunctive 
does not. Although the assertion theory captures the main characteristics of the indicative and the 
subjunctive, it cannot be generalised to all types of embedded clauses.
First of all, it is a problem that a subordinate clause does not convey the necessary information 
for creating an assertion. It is the sentence as a whole which creates assertion, not the subordinate 
phrase, which merely contributes to the assertion. In the case of embedded clauses subordinated 
to expressions of perception and communication, this problem is overcome by introducing what 
Terrell and Hooper call ‘reported assertion’ (Terrell/Hooper 1974: 486), thereby reckoning on two 
types of assertions for this sentence type: 
1. The assertion made by the speaker on the basis of the content of the sentence as a whole.
2. The assertion made by the referent of the subject of the superordinate expression on the 
basis of the content of the embedded clause.
This locates the assertion of the embedded clause at a secondary level at which it depends on 
the assertion of the whole sentence. This provides assertion with explanatory value in embedded 
clauses subordinate to expressions of perception and communication, but it cannot be generalised 
to all contexts. Nor can it be extended to relative clauses and adverbial phrases, as neither can be 
said to establish a proposition that can be attributed a truth-value. So an explanation in terms of 
assertion cannot be generalised to all modal contexts.
Furthermore, Terrell/Hooper (1974: 488) note that a group of embedded clauses which cannot 
be explained by the assertion theory are those which are subordinate to either mental comment 
predicates (9) or mental act predicates (10), as neither can be said to express an assertion.
(9) Lamento que la posición del gobierno sea(subj) negativa.
 ‘I regret that the position of the government is negative.’
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(10) Se dieron cuenta de que no tenían(ind) infraestructura sufi ciente.
‘They realised that their infrastructure was insuffi cient.’
 (examples extracted from REA – CREA)
Expressions of mental act and comment have in common that they imply presupposition: they 
presuppose the existence of a situation. However, they behave differently with regard to mood. 
Mental act predicates, as in (10), combine with the indicative. Under the assertion hypothesis 
one would have expected a meaning in terms of assertion, but carrying both a presupposition and 
an assertion is a contradiction in terms. However, it has been suggested that there is a difference 
between the presupposition of sentences such as (9) and (10) (Hooper 1973; Terrell 1975). The 
presupposition of (9) is strong because the truth of the proposition of the embedded clause holds 
good despite both negation and questioning. The presupposition of (10), on the other hand, is 
weak. This is due to the fact that embedded clauses of darse cuenta (‘to realise’) do not necessar-
ily establish situations whose truth is presupposed, as shown by (11).
(11) No se dieron cuenta de que no tuvieran(subj) infraestructura sufi ciente.
‘They did not realise that their infrastructure was insuffi cient.’
(10) and (11) differ in negation and infl ection for mood. The use of the indicative in (10) shows 
that the infrastructure was in fact insuffi cient. The use of the subjunctive in (11), on the other 
hand, shows that the infrastructure may or may not be suffi cient. The embedded clause of (11) is 
therefore not presupposed to be true. This shows beyond any doubt that there is a difference be-
tween the presuppositions established by mental act and comment predicates respectively, but I 
will claim that the explanation is only partial. In section 6, it is argued that a more substantial ex-
planation can be given with a starting point in information structure, as suggested by Mejías-Bi-
kandi (1994, 1998a and 1998b) and others.
Apart from the fact that the assertion theory cannot be generalised to all modal contexts, one 
main objection to the framework is that it is based on truth-conditional semantics, in which prop-
ositions are claimed to be true or false. This means that linguistic expressions acquire meaning by 
virtue of the fact that they correspond to objects in the world. Such a framework prevents us from 
explaining linguistic expressions which are not necessarily true with respect to the real world, for 
example because they do not describe entities or situations which actually exist or because prop-
erties assigned to entities do not correspond to reality (Fauconnier 1994: 15). In this paper it is ar-
gued that a cognitive framework has a greater explanatory value. In such a framework, meaning is 
constructed individually by interlocutors on the basis of linguistic expressions, context and back-
ground knowledge. This allows us to account for aspects of meaning which cannot be accounted 
for in the realm of truth-conditional semantics. In this sense, it does not matter whether proposi-
tions are true with respect to the real world or not. 
Mental space theory is a cognitive framework that explains the interpretation of linguistic ex-
pressions, how interlocutors get from input to output. The following section explains how mental 
space theory can be used in an analysis of mood.
4. Mental space theory
It is a basic premise of mental space theory that meaning is constructed mentally by interlocu-
tors on the basis of information from linguistic expressions in combination with information from 
context. This process is represented as a sequence of mental spaces which are linked and struc-
tured on the basis of information from language and context. Thus, the theory is a dynamic frame-
work for explaining the way in which interlocutors establish cognitive links between mental rep-
resentations established on the basis of information from language and context.
In the introductory note to Mental spaces, Fauconnier makes the observation that “Relatively 
simple grammatical structures give instructions for space construction in context” (Fauconnier: 
1994: 2). This statement makes at least three points.
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First, language provides information for an interpretive process. This suggests that meaning is 
not static, but is taken to be established dynamically by interlocutors in an interpretive process. 
Second, grammatical items guide this process by virtue of being instructional. This means that 
grammatical items are cues that guide the interpretive process1. In this article, it is furthermore 
argued that it is a main characteristic of grammatical items, as opposed to lexical items, that their 
meaning is stable and univocal: each grammatical item only has one meaning which may have 
different, although related nuances, depending on context. In the words of Thrane (1997: 238):
 “The semantic effect that a linguistic item has in virtue of being a carrier of meaning is always the 
same.”
Third, the interpretation depends on context. This means that the meaning of linguistic expres-
sions is undecidable per se, and is created with appeal to the linguistic context as well as to the 
extra-linguistic context. In this paper, it is assumed that linguistic and extra-linguistic context dif-
fer in nature in that the former contributes in a systematic way to interpretation, due to its conven-
tional nature (see for example Thrane 1997 and Dam/Dam-Jensen 2007 for a more detailed ac-
count of meaning), whereas extra-linguistic context does not contribute systematically, as it may 
originate from an infi nite number of sources (Dam/Dam-Jensen 2007: 91-93). In short, meaning 
can be said to be constructed in a hermeneutic circle in which the interpretation of each linguistic 
expression depends on that of the whole of which it forms part; but at the same time, the interpre-
tation of the context depends on the interpretation of the constituent parts.
5. Mental spaces and the semantics of mood
Mejías-Bikandi (1998a: 109) takes mood to be a marker that controls the fl ow of information be-
tween spaces. The indicative allows a connection to the speaker’s reality space, but the subjunc-
tive does not. 
On the basis of the points made above about grammatical items having a univocal instructional 
meaning, the following instructional values are suggested for the indicative and the subjunctive 
(slightly reformulated from Dam/Dam-Jensen 2010: 126):
• Indicative: Locate the situation created by the verb phrase relative to reality space.
• Subjunctive: Do not locate the situation created by the verb phrase relative to reality space.
As illustrated above (examples (6)-(8)), embedded clauses in the subjunctive can be subordinate 
to expressions which generate a greater variety of meaning than the indicative: the subjunctive 
can be used in both factual and non-factual contexts. To account for this general meaning, its in-
structional value is formulated as the “negative” counterpart of the indicative. In order to decide 
the exact shape of the situation described, it is necessary to appeal to context. It must therefore be 
the indicative which is the marked form and the subjunctive which is unmarked (contrary to what 
is traditionally presumed (Bosque 1990: 29)). 
Let us take a closer look at what it means to locate a situation relative to reality space. It is a ba-
sic premise of mental space theory that linguistic expressions create mental representations. ‘Situ-
ation’, therefore, does not refer to a situation of real life, but to speakers’ mental representations 
generated on the basis of linguistic expressions. Reality space, in turn, is also a mental represen-
tation, speakers’ mental representation of reality (Fauconnier 1994: 15), which accounts for their 
background knowledge or knowledge of the world. This space is therefore the so-called origin 
space relative to which the interpretive process unfolds. Consequently, to locate a situation rela-
tive to reality space is to establish a mental connection between the situation and reality space and 
to regard this situation as valid relative to this space.
1 Lexical items can also be characterised as being instructional: On receiving a token of a word type, the addressee 
is instructed to activate his concept attached to that word. Lexical meaning is therefore also instructional (Dam/Dam-
Jensen 2007: 86-87). See also Harder (2007) and Thrane (1997) for a detailed account of instructional meaning.
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The interpretive process is prompted by an utterance. The situation in which this takes place is 
called the utterance situation. Apart from the location of the speaker, an utterance situation con-
tains the location of the addressee. Its dimensions are determined by the volume of the utterance. 
In Figure 1 below, the utterance situation is depicted after Thrane (1980: 192-194): A is the speak-
er, B the addressee, and the dots are the objects of discourse or what is talked about. The fact that 
speakers may talk about both things which form part of the utterance situation (objects which 
are actually there) and things which do not is represented by the dots being outside or inside the 
marked space of the utterance situation.
Figure 1. Utterance situation (Thrane 1980: 194)
The nature of the utterance situation forms part of speakers’ conception of reality, or reality space.
These theoretical assumptions can now be applied in analysis. The verb phrase of the follow-
ing example appears in the indicative, which prompts the construction of a situation connected to 
reality space.
(12) La policía ha informado que al detenido se le acusa (ind) tanto de colocación de coche bomba como 
del tiroteo en la isla. 
‘The police have stated that the person under arrest is charged(ind) with both placing a car bomb and 
the shooting on the island.’
 (extracted from el País, 23/07/11)
In (12), the verb phrase, ha informado instructs the addressee to locate the established situation 
relative to his reality space. Locating a situation relative to reality space means that the situation 
exists in time and space, so it is a factual situation (see section 3). As mentioned above, the indica-
tive only carries information for the construction of factual situations.
The verb phrase of the next couple of examples (a repetition of (7) and (9) above) appears in 
the subjunctive and therefore does not create a link to reality space.
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(13) Hay muchos que esperan que caigan(subj).
‘There are many that hope that they will fall.’
(14) Lamento que la posición del gobierno sea(subj) negativa.
‘I regret that the position of the government is negative.’
In both (13) and (14), the subjunctive instructs the addressee not to connect the situation estab-
lished relative to reality space. The exact interpretation of what this means differs depending on 
the context. In (13), the meaning of the verb phrase of the superordinate clause, esperan, implies 
that the situation described in the embedded clause has not yet come into existence: it does not ex-
ist in time and space, it is non-factual. In (14), on the other hand, the meaning of the verb phrase 
of the superordinate clause, lamento, does not imply that the situation of the embedded clause is 
non-existent. Quite the opposite, it is already there: lamentar is a factive verb in the sense of Ki-
parsky/Kiparsky (1971), and as such it presupposes the existence of a situation. This is why the 
addressee is not instructed to create a link to reality space – it has already been established.
The analysis of for example lamentar in terms of presupposition is sometimes challenged by 
referring to sentences such as (15) below, used to pass on new information to the addressee2. 
(15) Lamento tener que despedirle.
‘I am sorry that I have to fi re you.’
The question that arises as a consequence of (15) is how it can be used to transfer new informa-
tion even though lamentar carries a presupposition. The answer to the question lies in the seman-
tics-pragmatics distinction. The information that the speaker wants to convey to the addressee is 
that he is being fi red, but by presupposing this information and thereby presenting something dif-
ferent as the new information (lamento), the speaker downplays the presumed seriousness of the 
information. In this sense, it is the semantics, the language system, which forms the basis for the 
way we interpret language in use. 
A different group of verbs that deserves an explanation with a starting point in the suggested 
values are verbs of communication and perception, such as the semi-factive verb creer (‘think’). 
When these verbs are un-negated, they typically appear in the indicative (16), whereas they can 
appear in both the subjunctive (17) and the indicative (18) if they are negated. 
(16) Javier creía que estaba(ind) en casa Carmen.
‘Javier thought that Carmen was at home.’
(17) Javier no creía que estuviera(subj) en casa Carmen.
Javier did not think that Carmen was at home.’
(18) Javier no creía que estaba(ind) en casa Carmen.
‘Javier did not think that Carmen was at home.’
In (16), we will say that the situation established by the embedded clause is interpreted as being a 
situation which is assumed by the speaker to be true. Translated into mental space terms, a situa-
tion is created which, according to the speaker, is located relative to reality space. In (17), on the 
other hand, the addressee is not instructed to locate the situation of the embedded clause relative 
to reality space. The sentence does not carry information as to whether the situation is factual or 
not: this may or may not be the case. The use of the subjunctive merely shows the speaker’s lack 
of belief that the situation was a fact. In (18), on the other hand, the superordinate clause carries 
the information that the speaker at some point in the past did not believe that the situation of the 
embedded clause was a fact. However, the use of the indicative of estaba shows that this situation 
was in fact factual: the referent of Carmen was at home.
2 I would like to thank Professor Henning Nølke for pointing this out to me.
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With regard to the interpretation of the indicative in terms of reality, it could be objected that 
verb phrases in the future tense of the indicative3 do not establish situations in time and space be-
cause from the perspective of the utterance situation they have not yet taken place and therefore 
do not generate a factual interpretation. However, in the context of this study, it will be assumed 
that the future instructs the addressee to establish a situation which according to the speaker will 
take place after the time of utterance (Jensen 2002: 4). This can be explained by considering the 
following three examples.
(19) Dice que Lucas vendrá(future).
‘He says that Lucas will come.’
(20) Dice que Lucas va(present of ind) a venir.
‘He says that Lucas will come.’
(21) Duda que venga(present of subj) Lucas.
‘He doubts that Lucas will come.’
None of the verb phrases in the embedded clauses of these three examples establishes a situation 
which coincides with the utterance situation. In (19), the verb phrase of the embedded clause in-
structs the addressee to establish a situation posterior to the utterance situation in which the refer-
ent of Lucas, according to the speaker, will come. This situation is understood as a prediction. In 
(20), the verb phrase of the embedded clause is a verbal periphrasis in which the fi nite verb ap-
pears in the present tense. The addressee is therefore instructed to construct a situation in which 
the referent of Lucas comes: in the utterance situation there are indications that this is true. Both 
(19) and (20) establish a situation which is located in time and space. In (21), on the other hand, 
the verb phrase of the embedded clause does not establish a situation located in time and space 
because the verb dudar describes a situation whose existence is unsure.
The next section explains this interpretive difference with reference to information structure.
6. Mood and information structure
Both Mejías-Bikandi (1998b) and Gregory (2001) explain mood as a difference in information. 
According to Mejías-Bikandi (1998b: 947), the indicative presents new information, whereas the 
subjunctive presents either old information or untrue situations.
As we have just seen, sentences with the subjunctive with a factual interpretation carry a pre-
supposition. So they do not provide new information, and in this sense they are not informative 
per se. The addressee must search for this elsewhere, and the place to look is in the superordinate 
clause, the speaker’s evaluation of the situation described in the embedded clause. This presents 
new information. 
We saw above that it is not only factive verbs (or comment predicates) that carry a presupposi-
tion, but also mental act predicates. The problem is, though, that mental act predicates appear with 
the indicative, whereas comment predicates appear with the subjunctive. This modal difference 
can be explained by information structure. T he lexical meaning of comment predicates presup-
poses that the addressee has previous knowledge of the situation in the embedded clause, whereas 
this is not the case with mental act predicates, which will always present the situation of the em-
bedded clause as new information. Both predicate types carry a presupposition of existence, but 
not of knowledge.
In (9) and (15) above, the verb lamentar presupposes that the addressee has previous knowl-
edge of the position of the government. This is old information. In (10), on the other hand, darse 
3 The future tense is not used in the subjunctive in modern Spanish, apart from in very specialised contexts, such as 
in legal language.
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cuenta does not presuppose that the addressee has previous knowledge of this situation. The dif-
ference in presupposition is a difference in knowledge. In mental space terms, this is a difference 
between the content of the reality space of the speaker and the addressee, that is, a difference be-
tween the background knowledge of the speaker and that of the addressee (compare section 5). 
7. Generalisation of the analysis – a sketch 
At the beginning of this presentation I set out to substantiate the assumption that mood is a ques-
tion of connection/non-connection to reality space. A thorough analysis would require confron-
tation with independent clauses as well as with adverbial and relative clauses. With regard to ad-
verbial and relative clauses, one would have to take into account the fact that the three kinds of 
subordinate clauses represent different kinds of subordination and therefore generate a different 
interpretation of the established situation and its relation to the superordinate situation. 
Whereas embedded clauses establish a situation which is characterised by a superordinate situ-
ation created by a superordinate expression, adverbial clauses establish a logical relation relative 
to the situation established by the superordinate expression, e.g. of time, cause or consequence. 
For example, adverbial clauses introduced by a conjunction of time can either establish a situ-
ation which is prior to or coinciding with the situation established by the superordinate expres-
sion, thereby creating a link to reality space. However, they may also establish a situation which 
is subsequent to the situation of the superordinate expression.
The nature of dependency of relative clauses to the superordinate expression differs from that 
of adverbial clauses and embedded clauses in that they are complements of nominal constitu-
ents. The result is that relative clauses establish a property of the entity created by the nominal 
constituent. When the verb phrase of a relative clause appears in the indicative, the entity of the 
nominal constituent is conceptualised as existing in a factual situation (reality space), set up by 
the relative clause. If the verb phrase appears in the subjunctive, on the other hand, the entity of 
the nominal constituent is set up in a situation which is not connected to reality space: the entity 
does not exist in a factual situation.
As indicated above, it is a basic premise of this work that the meaning of a grammatical item 
is always the same. As both the indicative and the subjunctive can be used in a variety of con-
texts, their instructional values, in particular in the case of the subjunctive, are formulated in very 
general terms. An analysis in terms of these values therefore works at a high level of abstraction. 
On the one hand, one result of this is that they do not have a very high degree of testability in 
the sense of Popper (1959). In order for falsifi cation and prediction to take place, these general 
values could be spelled out in more concrete values deduced from the general ones. On the oth-
er hand, however, the instructional values provide the language user with a basis for explaining 
instances of the indicative and the subjunctive which, on the face of it, could look like different 
uses of the same modal form. This will provide a methodologically uniform basis for the expla-
nation of the way the two modal forms can be used.
It should be noted that while the explanation suggested in this paper may be operational for 
mood in Spanish, it cannot be generalised to French, for example. I will not expand on the dif-
ferences in the use of mood in the two languages, but merely give a couple of illustrative exam-
ples. In Spanish, embedded clauses subordinated to the noun idea often appear in the subjunc-
tive. This is not the case in French, where idée generally combines with the indicative, as shown 
by Jønsson (2011). Furthermore, the subjunctive can only be used after dire if it appears in the 
imperative, as opposed to Spanish (compare for example (3b) above).
Summing up, there are still loose ends that remain to be addressed, which can strengthen 
and refi ne the assumptions presented above. To increase the testability of the instructional val-
ues, they can be translated to a lower level of abstraction. On this basis, the values can be tested 
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against a more substantial amount of data – not only embedded clauses, but also adverbial and 
relative clauses. Lastly, comparative studies can be conducted of the use of mood in Spanish and 
in French, for instance. This could help refi ne the basic assumption of factuality presented in this 
article.
8. Concluding remarks
Based on the account of mood suggested in this article, grammatical items provide univocal and 
constant information as an input to the interpretive process of the addressee. Such an account 
obeys the principles of generalisation of the object of study and uniformity in its analysis. It is 
argued that the indicative instructs the addressee to locate the situation established by the verb 
phrase relative to reality space. In the case of the subjunctive, the addressee is instructed not to 
create a link to reality space. The fact that the subjunctive is formulated as the “negative coun-
terpart” of the indicative has the effect that its instructional meaning is very general. As a conse-
quence, many contextual clues are required in order to reach a precise interpretation.
It was argued in the introduction that mental space theory is an appropriate framework for rep-
resenting the dynamic nature of meaning: words do not come with a static, prefabricated meaning 
– instead, meaning is the result of an interpretive process.
I would like to conclude with a quote that can be said to encapsulate the basic principle behind 
this paper:
 “So, to conclude, it has been my aim to substantiate a claim that meaning does something – in fact 
that it provides the information in terms of which mental models are constructed, manipulated and 
searched. And if you feel that what I’ve said has done something to you, I may have succeeded!” 
(Thrane 1997: 249).
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